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THE INSANITY PLEA: THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE. By William J. Winslade and Judith Wilson Ross. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons. 1983. Pp. xii, 226. $15.75. 
America was shocked when John Hinckley was found not guilty 
by reason of insanity in the shooting of President Reagan. A nation 
that watched Hinckley pull the trigger on countless television replays 
recoiled at the prospect of his being released from a psychiatric hos-
pital within as little as six months. As the public vented its outrage, 
the insanity defense came under renewed attack. In The Insanity 
Plea, William Winslade1 and Judith Ross2 offer their contribution to 
this trend by arguing for the abolition of the insanity defense. 
The authors claim that the insanity defense "defeats justice, dis-
credits psychiatry, and enrages the public" (p. 20). The root of the 
problem is the use of "expert psychiatric testimony" in insanity 
cases. According to the authors, such testimony is inappropriate for 
two reasons. First, the public in general and the jurors in particular 
falsely assume that psychiatry is based on a scientifically tested the-
ory and body of knowledge with definable elements (p. 9). Contrary 
to the popular assumption, say Winslade and Ross, psychiatric testi-
mony consists of speculation derived from theories that lack a scien-
tific basis. Because these theories are couched in technical jargon 
presumably created by experts, they carry undue weight with the 
jury, even though lay persons could often observe and evaluate the 
behavior in question just as easily as a psychiatrist could (pp. 10-11 ). 
The second reason why psychiatric testimony is inappropriate is 
the philosophical incompatibility of law and psychiatry (p. 12). Law 
and psychiatry, the authors contend, are predicated on divergent 
views about whether humans are free agents. The law proceeds on 
the premise that one freely chooses to do an act (p. 12). It therefore 
holds people morally responsible for these acts and punishes them 
for their commission. Psychiatry does not make the same assump-
tion about free choice. Instead, it assumes that behavior is deter-
mined by prior events or psychological or physiological states (pp. 
12-13). To the extent that behavior is caused by forces beyond a 
person's control, it does not have a moral dimension. The authors 
conclude that these two conflicting assumptions about human free-
dom and hence about moral responsibility produce the intolerable 
result that "guilty" defendants are not convicted because jurors are 
confused about the human mind. According to this analysis, psychi-
I. William Winslade is co-director of the Program in Medicine, Law and Human Values at 
UCLA, where he is an Adjunct Professor of Law and Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychia-
try. He conducts a psychoanalytic practice and is also a consultant to the President's Commis-
sion on Medical Ethics. 
2. Judith Wilson Ross is a lecturer in the UCLA Department of Psychiatry and also serves 
as Assistant Director of the UCLA Program in Medicine, Law and Human Values. 
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atric testimony about mental conditions manipulates jurors attempt-
ing to determine the defendant's state of mind when the act was 
committed. 
The authors attempt to support their argument by discussing 
seven actual trials in which the defendant used the insanity defense. 
For example, they use the trials of Dan White, Leonard Smith, and 
John Hinckley to illustrate how psychiatrists manipulate jurors and 
how jurors manipulate each other (pp. 201-02). In dealing with a 
defendant with whom they can sympathize, jurors conclude that the 
basically good defendant must have been crazy to have committed 
the crime. In essence, "when Uurors can] not understand on a per-
sonal level what [the defendant] was doing, or why he was doing it, 
they are inclined to see the behavior as evidence of mental illness 
and . . . insanity" (p. 194). Psychiatrists give jurors a pseudo-scien-
tific explanation for their reasoning, allowing them to rationalize an 
otherwise emotional verdict. Yet, jurors do not even realize what 
they are doing; those questioned after the Hinckley verdict did not 
seem to know why they voted not guilty by reason of insanity (p. 
202). The insanity defense permits jurors unconsciously to use psy-
chiatric explanations of behavior to replace responsibility for their 
actions (p. 197). 
The authors use the Tex Watson trial to show the disarray, 
vagueness and confusion of psychiatric testimony (pp. 103-32). In 
that case, no less than ten mental health "experts" gave conflicting 
analyses. According to the authors, these conflicts arose because 
psychiatrists, unlike other scientific experts, do not have a generally 
accepted, scientifically based standard of knowledge. Psychiatric 
judgments mislead jurors because they are presented as "scientific 
fact" even though they are nothing more than untested hypotheses. 
The Robert Tornsey trial supposedly illustrates how the legal sys-
tem errs in using involuntary treatment as an alternative to punish-
ment (pp. 133-58). Tornsey was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity, committed for treatment, and released shortly thereafter. 
The authors suggest that because the jurors sympathized with Torn-
sey and assumed he would be committed for a long time, they opted 
for a verdict they felt would be less stigmatizing (p. 142). However, 
the doctors could not hold Tornsey because he had no illness to 
treat. Thus, Winslade and Ross conclude, involuntary commitment 
is an inadequate alternative to prison. 
Although they concede that the insanity defense is rarely used 
and seldom succeeds, the authors argue that it must be abolished in 
order to restore some respectability to the criminal justice system (p. 
19). They also advocate the elimination of most psychiatric testi-
mony, including all testimony by psychiatrists regarding mental 
states (p. 129). They would replace the insanity defense with the ver-
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diet of "guilty but mentally ill" for cases where the defendant ad-
mits commission of the proscribed act (p. 223). Under this verdict, 
the defendant would receive the same sentence as any other defend-
ant convicted for the same offense but would be eligible for psychiat-
ric treatment. Finally, the authors propose a change in the structure 
of criminal trials when the defen.dant pleads mental illness (p. 201). 
They would bifurcate the proceeding into a phase in which the jury 
determined guilt and a phase in which the jury determined the pen-
alty. In the guilt phase of this two-part proceeding, the jurors would 
not consider the defendant's mental state; such evidence would be 
admissible only in the penalty phase. The linchpin of these propos-
als is the abolition of psychiatric testimony regarding the mental 
state of the defendant. The authors claim that as long as psychia-
trists know so little about mental states and as long as jurors cannot 
distinguish insane conduct from criminal conduct (p. 219), jurors 
must not be allowed to hear evidence concerning mental states. 
Without the abolition of testimony regarding mental states, the in-
sanity defense will continue to ensure that the "guilty" are not con-
victed, because jurors are too sympathetic to certain kinds of 
violence; too blind to their own hidden and hostile natures; too 
frightened of madness to face it; and too irresponsible to make their 
own decision when "experts" are available to do so for them. 
In reaching these conclusions, the authors make some provoca-
tive assertions. Unfortunately, they offer nothing more than that. 
The principal defect of the book is the authors' failure to support 
their claims. This defect is especially troublesome in the face of 
other writings arguing contrary positions. Four examples of their 
unsupported assertions follow. 
A fundamental difficulty lies in the claim that law and psychiatry 
are philosophically incompatible, a notion that moves the authors to 
call for the assignment of guilt for specific criminal acts without con-
sideration of the actor's mental state. This position runs counter to 
the long-standing basis for criminal responsibility: cognitive and vo-
litional capacity.3 Indeed, even others who argue for the abolition of 
the insanity defense would permit consideration of the defendant's 
mental state.4 The authors have, perhaps unwittingly, called for a 
fundamental restructuring of criminal responsibility. To justify such 
3. Traditionally, conviction requires that a defendant have reasonably rational, self-di-
rected control over his or her behavior, as well as the mental state required for liability as 
defined by the offense. Morse, Failed Explanations and Criminal Responsibility: Experts of the 
Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971, 976 (1982). These requirements arise from the moral notion 
that guilt should not be imposed where choice is lacking. Morris, Tl1e Criminal Responsibility of 
the Mentally Ill, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 477, 502 (1982). 
4. Morris, for example, would admit evidence of the defendant's mental state just as any 
other evidence bearing on the elements of the crime. See Morris supra note 3, at 509-12, 
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a major change, they should have provided empirical analysis in-
stead of mere anecdotes. 
The authors make a second set of assertions about the motives of 
juries in reaching verdicts. They explain that not guilty by reason of 
insanity verdicts are the result of either juror sympathy for, or fear 
of, the defendant (p. 18). Significantly, the authors present no empir-
ical support for these theories. One wonders whether they are judg-
ing jurors' mental states with the same sort of post hoc psychological 
analysis that psychiatry supposedly misuses in dealing with criminal 
defendants. The authors not only fail to off er any support of their 
own, but they also completely ignore existing research on jury be-
havior. This research indicates that juries, as rated by trial judges, 
are remarkably sensitive to the strength of evidence and that the pic-
ture of "undisciplined rabble settling cases by prejudice and caprice" 
is undeserved. 5 However disillusioned the authors may be with a sys-
tem that permits twelve laypersons to decide which group of expert 
witnesses is correct, their complaint lies against the jury system as a 
whole, not just against the insanity plea. But the authors never mar-
shal evidence for such a broad indictment. 
The authors would respond to the argument that their criticisms 
are not unique to the insanity plea by claiming that expert psychiat-
ric testimony, unlike that of economists or engineers, is singularly 
inappropriate for juries. The authors assert, for a third time without 
support, that psychiatric testimony is unusually contradictory and 
that scientific experts in other fields show a much greater degree of 
consensus. But the mere existence of stables of experts who will tes-
tify on either side of an issue in both civil a~d criminal trials -
economists in antitrust cases, for example -f- casts considerable 
doubt on this argument.6 Certainly the fact that psychiatric evalua-
tions are not provable or undisputed does not necessarily mean that 
they are inadmissible.7 
5. Wasserman & Robinson, Extra-Legal l'!fluences, Group Processes, and Jury l)ecision-
making: A Psychological Perspective, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 96, 98 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
Wasserman and Robinson rely substantially on the research of Kalven and Zeisel, which 
shows that judges and juries usually agree on verdicts and that disagreements arise mainly 
from evidentiary factors. Where the defense of insanity was raised, it was almost never a 
source of disagreement. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, 56, 329-30 
(1966). 
6. In Tanay, Forensic Psychiatry and Justice, 62 MICH. B. J. 206 (1983), the author argues 
that forensic psychiatry, like all applied sciences, does not offer certainty. It attempts only to 
present psychic reality to a legal setting by offering and expounding upon the contradictory 
opinion of psychiatrists. No testimony possesses absolute reliability and validity. Inconsisten-
cies in psychiatric testimony take on special importance, Tanay contends, only because of the 
sensationalistic way the news media presents them. 
7. On this issue, the book is part ofan ongoing debate about the value of psychiatric testi-
mony. Whereas Morse,supra note 3, at 973-76, agrees with the authors of this book, Bonnie & 
Slobogin, 'I7ze Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: 'I7ze Case for In-
formed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427,461,488 (1980), argue that such testimony is valuable 
in helping jurors organize information and in suggesting explanations for puzzling behavior. 
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Finally, the authors assert that replacement of the insanity de-
fense with the verdict of guilty but mentally ill would be a "workable 
solution" (p. 219). This substitution would eliminate consideration 
of the defendant's mental state in the guilt phase of the trial, while 
supposedly letting jurors show their compassion for the mentally ill 
in the allocation of punishment, rehabilitation, and treatment (p. 
219). But research on the verdict of guilty but mentally ill indicates 
that defendants so convicted do not receive treatment different from 
that of other convicted defendants. 8 Though not all opponents of the 
insanity defense also advocate adoption of the verdict of guilty but 
mentally ill,9 the authors cavalierly assume that the verdict would be 
a marked improvement over the present system. Again, they leave 
the reader wondering why. 
The Insanity Plea presents an interesting theory of how juries 
function in cases involving the insanity defense. Unfortunately, the 
book presents little evidence to support that theory. It lacks the em-
pirical data needed to call into question existing studies that are gen-
erally favorable to the jury system.10 Perhaps, then, the main value 
of the book lies in its suggestion of directions for study in insanity 
cases. As a vehicle for argument, however, the book fails; it is un-
persuasive to anyone not already convinced that the insanity defense 
should be abolished. · 
They contend that the risk of jurors giving undue weight to this testimony has been grossly 
exaggerated. Id at 493. 
8. See Project, Evalutating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 
16 U. MICH J.L. REF. 77, 104-05 (1982). The study indicates that juries used the verdict for 
defendants whom they would otherwise have found guilty. The availability of the verdict did 
not reduce the frequency with which defendants raised the insanity defense. Id at 101-02, 
9. Morris, supra note 3, at 527-31. 
10. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEIZEL, supra note 5, at 56, 329-30; Wasserman & Robinson, 
supra note 5, at 98. 
